Brewing Cybersecurity Insights

Category: Cybersecurity profession and career

23andMe, and Us?

It is a pleasure to present a collaboration article with Fabrizio Cilli.

As a dedicated cybersecurity enthusiast and pioneer, Fabrizio’s journey has been marked by global experiences, from Rome to the most advanced innovation hubs of North America and Asia, and through historical transformative projects in the Middle East. At Telecom Italia, he played a key role in the early days of Security Operations Centers (SOC), setting the stage for leadership positions that influenced cybersecurity advancements across sectors.

Leading as the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) at Open Fiber, Fabrizio was pivotal in building a robust cybersecurity framework from scratch, marking achievements like the formation of XIRT (Any Incident Response Team) and striving for ISO 27001 certification. His work extended globally with renowned firms such as Datamat, Accenture, RESI/IPS, and EMC, where he focused on integrating cloud security, managing mergers and acquisitions, conducting due diligence, and safeguarding critical infrastructure.

A passionate advocate for the integration of artificial intelligence in cybersecurity, Fabrizio collaborated with the Italian Digitalization Team (Team Digitale) and co-founded the collective CISOs4AI (together with yours truly) and other great minds, underlining his commitment to harnessing AI for overcoming security challenges. His career is a testament to overcoming challenges, pushing boundaries, and fostering innovation, with a clear mission to cultivate a security-first mindset, drive technological empowerment, and ensure cybersecurity serves as a foundation of trust and resilience in our digital age.

So without further ado…

23andMe, and Us?

It all started from a response letter by 23andMe legal department, after CISO and some other directors had sold their stock options before the incident disclosure.

Facing an onslaught of lawsuits, 23andMe is denying liability for millions of users’ genetic records leaked last fall.In a letter sent to a group of users suing the company obtained by TechCrunch, lawyers representing the biotech company laid out a case that users were to blame for any data that may have been exposed.

It would be fantastic to have oversight and complexity requirements in place. Requiring multiple authentication factors has always been a key tool to prevent breaches from occurring. Companies like Microsoft, Google, Amazon, telecoms, banks, insurers, and healthcare providers all carefully control account access. They do this not just for prevention, but also to demonstrate maximum diligence. This is in a context where co-responsibility between companies and users is inevitable.

And if the responsibility of the external user is passed on as a “charter of rights and duties” (perhaps in terms and conditions between company and user), should we then consider that in a company, if it is discovered that a breach originated from a weak password (one of those in the annual most common lists) of an employee user, the latter falls into a scope of “bad faith” such as to stimulate an investigation for administrative liability? 

I mean, how much can responsibility be shifted to the user, given current standards for verifying the suitability of access control and administration measures (even more so for administrative accesses)?

Let’s talk about it, but if I think about Uber and SolarWinds, and then focus on 23andMe, and all the hospital ransomwares lately…I get a headache.

So if at the italian occurrence of attack to ASL1 L’Aquila, we understand that “it all started from a user with a weak password” or in the attack to MediBank Australia, a “user” propagated the attack, do we charge the 5 billion AUS Dollars to them and just move on? 👀😅

Such cases and similar situations, which we all know too well (and some scenarios we have experienced together, with some fellow CISO), where a user just leaves the doors open, what happens to these? Do we chase/investigate our own users? Could they be held responsible for the resulting damage? And on what rule and norm?

I want to clarify: full and robust user responsibility would be a breath of fresh air for most colleagues with millions users, but does this possibility even exist in current practice, that you are aware of? 👀

It is clear that the user who allows an attacker to use a “native” function is not ideal, but every low and slow attack and every APT we fight stems from the fact that we consider the user (I’m getting close to zero “user” trust theory) as potentially malicious or compromised.

So if a Sino-Russian-North Korean or Italo American criminal, with fake documents enters, and with that function manages to view data from thousands of other people, would we not notice? Is the system designed to prevent repeated abuse? Would GDPR minimization, applied to this processing, have required that it not be possible for example to “accumulate” sensitive data like this, but maybe only view genetic closeness, and then request direct contact? How did they design the registry at 23andMe?

When I say data is the lifeblood of a company I mean it seriously. If the lifeblood becomes poisoned, or too much comes out, the plant dies. 🌵🏜️

And then the dilemma: if one of “our” internal users blatantly violates a policy, procedure, and playbook, and leaves admin admin, while doing the ceremonial of an HSM, and we basically lose all our secrets?

Are we (the company) or is the user (colleague) administratively responsible? (And here the insurance systems on AdS come into play…)

It is certainly a good debate.

But in the end I believe there are various safe passes, both for users and colleagues, when it comes to access and management of technologies and privileges imposed on them.

The “good family man” remains the company, the multitude of individuals who manage the systems are its own, with its procedures and internal and external regulations. It is not a 1-to-1 relationship with the user, it is a many-to-1 or many-to-many relationship.

The Regulations we advertise, and for which we request flags, signatures etc., exist precisely to ensure they are not violated, due to boredom and lack of reading or reconciliation.

The Countermeasures we implement guarantee controls, and verify that the healthy behaviors we ask to assume are assumed, by those who use our systems and services, preventing them from circumventing them to facilitate the user experience.

Of course it is true that if we do not solve the problem of “passwords”, it is like having a low cipher forced by incompatibility, and not being able to apply a patch for life…

Perhaps this is what Sam Altman is aiming for with his WorldCoin startup: the full and unequivocal recognizability of the user… Will he make it?

And how will 23andMe end up?

There is very much at stake and an ongoing court case, that didn’t really start on the best terms.

Now, I don’t mean to make light of this situation, but the reality is that: Cybersecurity maturity needs to be embedded in a company’s very DNA. It requires integration, communication, and transparency primarily between the business itself and its clients.

Or it won’t work. In a fully digital world, you need fully digital cyber protection. Your business doesn’t sleep, crooks do not sleep, your clients are cycling around the world and guess what? They are not sleeping at the moment.

If it was enough to have “security” across the company, and “secure by design” software, today it’s about having a “secure by design company” and “software security” in place.

Word games? No, it’s the real deal.

You can get wiped out from the market.

And now the bombshell that will make you think: in such a scenario, even your competition can harm your core business by means of criminal hackers.

Resilience, and security by design with zero-trust: it’s worth it.

The Rising Stakes for Cybersecurity Accountability

An Analysis of the SEC notice to SolarWinds CISO and CFO

The Rising Stakes for Cybersecurity Accountability
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The cybersecurity landscape is witnessing an unprecedented shift. The recent move by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to issue Wells Notices to the CFO and CISO of SolarWinds is a bellwether of this change.

A Wells Notice is a communication from the SEC indicating that it has made a preliminary decision to recommend enforcement action against the recipient, although it is not a formal charge of wrongdoing or a final determination of violation​.

The SEC’s decision suggests a new emphasis on individual accountability within organizations for cybersecurity management and incident disclosure. However, this development also shines a light on a complex challenge: the multifaceted and collective nature of cybersecurity.

Why is this significant?

Firstly, it demonstrates an increased scrutiny of companies’ responses to cyberattacks. In this case, the SEC alleges that SolarWinds violated certain provisions of U.S. federal securities laws in its cybersecurity disclosures, public statements, and internal controls following the cyberattack in 2020, which affected thousands of customers globally​.

Secondly, this is unusual because a Wells Notice is typically sent to a company itself, not individuals within the company. Wells Notice are usually reserved for CEOs or CFOs in cases of Ponzi schemes, accounting fraud, or market manipulation.

This development suggests that the SEC might be moving towards holding individuals, particularly CISOs, more accountable for managing cybersecurity and disclosing cyber incidents. One possible violation that a CISO might commit is a failure to disclose material information, such as failing to disclose the gravity of an incident or failing to do so in a timely manner. This is a trend confirmed by the the previous conviction of Uber’s CISO and his sentence.

However, some cybersecurity professionals argue that attributing blame solely to the CISO or CFO might not always be fair or accurate, because…

… Cybersecurity management typically involves various stakeholders

In today’s digitized world, a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) plays an essential role far beyond just implementing and managing security measures. The CISO’s duty also involves making other CXOs accountable for their part in cybersecurity. This includes ensuring that for instance that:

  • HR make sure that the resources completes the necessary security training,
  • Risk Management keeps cyber risks within defined thresholds,
  • Finance aligns the security budget with mitigation strategies (that in turn are based on the organization strategies and risks),
  • IT oversees the secure development and maintenance of applications.

But what happens when risk acceptance is chosen as the path forward?

If a CXO or the CEO decides to accept a risk, they should be accountable for that decision. It is crucial that such risk acceptance is well-documented and tracked.

I assume that in SolarWind and Uber incidents top management might have wanted to take a risk acceptance decision but didn’t want it to be documented (I assume because I personally saw this happening).

Conversely, a too accommodating CISO who fails to enforce necessary security measures might find themselves, and put their organization, in the firing line.

The Challenge of Execution

An important yet often overlooked aspect of cybersecurity is the actual execution of security measures. Even when a CISO or security leader gives orders for security actions, the implementation may not always follow through, especially if the person responsible isn’t part of the cybersecurity team. These orders may go unfulfilled due to conflicting priorities, and performance objectives that do not include security are not helping.

This state of affairs points to the need for organizations to align their objectives across departments and ensure that security is a shared priority. Without this alignment, the cybersecurity of the organization remains fractured and vulnerable.

No matter how robust the cybersecurity measures are, it’s impossible to prevent all cyberattacks. I think that the sophistication of the SolarWind attack is a great example of that.

Risk mitigation doesn’t aim for 100% security—residual risks are inevitable. Therefore, managing risks effectively within acceptable thresholds becomes the primary goal. This goal underlines the need for comprehensive risk management strategies that involve all stakeholders in an organization. Let’s not forget that security is just one of many goals of an organization, which also has to do business, and too much security might make the company non-competitive.

The Road Ahead

The SEC’s move towards increased individual accountability in cybersecurity could have profound implications for how organizations manage cybersecurity risks. However, it’s essential for organizations (and governments) to remember that cybersecurity is a collective responsibility. It requires coordinated efforts across departments and roles.

This reality makes the role of the CISO even more critical. They need to bridge the gap between different stakeholders and ensure a holistic approach to cybersecurity. While the SEC’s move might bring with it new challenges and pressures, it also presents an opportunity: to reaffirm the collective responsibility of cybersecurity, reinforcing that it is a task that falls on everyone’s shoulders within an organization.

A persisting question I have is: what should a CISO do if the CEO orders them not to disclose material information and to avoid documenting this decision?

A CISO who blindly follows such orders risks becoming a Scapegoat Officer, serving as a convenient fall guy in the aftermath of a cyber incident rather than actively improving the security posture of their organization. And he/she might not be inclined to do so if they will be put behind bars for that.

That’s a real pickle, so a second question arise: what a government should do to avoid it?

Maybe foresee a sort of Whistle-blowing channel for CISOs that would guarantee a criminal shield in case of situations like the SolarWind and Uber ones?

Last question, what would happen if the company uses a vCISO or a CISO-as-a-Service?

Navigating this new landscape will be challenging, but with clear communication, well-defined roles, and a shared commitment to security, organizations can rise to the occasion. It’s not just about preventing the next big cyberattack—it’s about fostering a culture of shared responsibility and vigilance that permeates every level of the organization. In this era of increasing cyber threats, there is no other way forward.

Battling Burnout in Cybersecurity

Battling Burnout in Cybersecurity
Photo by fauxels from Pexels

5 Key Strategies for Enduring Team Resilience

Introduction

The cybersecurity field presents unique challenges and stressors, resulting in change fatigue that threatens the sustainability of security teams.

Why are cybersecurity teams burning out? Talent shortages, understaffing, and fading motivation are hitting hard, and employee burnout is becoming one of the biggest threats to cybersecurity teams. To address this growing problem, it’s crucial to implement strategies that promote sustainability and mitigate fatigue among cybersecurity professionals.

In recent speech on talent (I already talked about this in a LinkedIn Post), I shared my experience of a resignation of a key resource that ultimately resulted in me becoming a better leader. By acknowledging the failure and learning from it, I was able to create a more supportive and understanding environment for my team.

In a recent Gartner article, “Four Tactics to Mitigate Change Fatigue,” CIOs are provided with valuable strategies to combat change fatigue within their organizations.

While primarily targeting CIOs, these tactics can be adapted to address the sustainability crisis in cybersecurity teams, or any team. These are all strategies that I pursue (badly or well can only be said by the people who work with me). In this article we’ll explore those revised four strategies and my additional ones, to ensure a lasting journey of fatigue mitigation.

Strategies for a Sustainable Journey of Fatigue Mitigation in Cybersecurity Teams:

  1. Treat change fatigue as a business issue: Cybersecurity is particularly stressful due to the constant security debt and the fear of being hit by a major attack. Balancing short-term objectives with long-term goals is crucial to prevent employee burnout, anxiety, that ultimately ends in resignation. It’s important to incorporate change fatigue as a factor when planning initiatives and prioritize projects to reduce the impact of fatigue on the team, e.g. by avoiding excessive workload, or the week-end warriors phenomenon.
  2. Distribute change leadership: Decisions in cybersecurity often require trade-offs between business, as-is operations, and security. Engaging business leaders and experts in decision-making at all levels can lead to more successful outcomes and reduce the burden of decision-making, which is a key cause of stress. Collaboration among different leaders is essential for making informed decisions. I’d add that also clear responsibilities are a must as unclear expectations are another a big source of stress. A key point here is that Cybersecurity leaders should hold the other leaders accountable in making the organization more secure (if this accountability fails, the organization will be significantly less secure).
  3. Co-create execution and involve stakeholders: In the long run, employees who feel a sense of purpose and are involved in the change management process will become the “leaders of tomorrow.” Creating cross-pollination between teams is paramount, with attacks targeted on people (e.g., phishing, CEO Fraud), on the supply chain, all departments must collaborate to secure the enterprise. This principle is also true inside of the Cybersecurity function, resources working on detection and response and those focused on protection measures must all know the vision and the strategy and know what the others are doing, this is crucial for a more cohesive and empowered team.
  4. Focus on the journey, not just the end goals: Instead of solely concentrating on the end goal, emphasize the process and progress made throughout the journey. Security is a continuous journey, not a goal that can be reached. By celebrating progress and creating a positive environment, the team will feel accomplished and motivated during the entire journey.

Allow me to add some additional personal strategies: make sure that employees are supported, they feel valued, have a work-life balance, and have the opportunity for personal growth and development. It’s essential to provide continuous feedback, both positive and negative, and to clearly explain what is good and what needs improvement. This empowers employees with the right to fail, as long as they learn from their mistakes and grow. Addressing issues in real-time ensures the team remains successful, rather than waiting until the end of the year to provide a feedback and having low performances in the meantime.

Bottom line, cybersecurity staff should feel committed and believe that the cybersecurity leadership is composed of individuals with a little more experience who empower them.

Conclusion

Adapting the strategies above can help address the sustainability crisis in cybersecurity teams by mitigating change fatigue and successfully battling burnout in cybersecurity.

By treating change fatigue as a business issue, distributing change leadership, co-creating execution, and focusing on the journey rather than just the end goals, cybersecurity teams can remain resilient and effective in an ever-evolving landscape. Embracing change and personal growth as a leader is essential to building a strong, empowered, and sustainable team.

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